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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MUNICIPAL
BILLBOARD ORDINANCES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
FREE

SPEECH-Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453

U.S.

490

(1981).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The first amendment of the United States Constitution states in
part that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech. . . ."1 City ordinances declare that municipalities have the
power to zone through the police power of the state. 2 When zoning
ordinances attempt to limit billboard advertising, however, these two
rights conflict, and the power to zone will sometimes infringe upon a
person's freedom of speech. This note examines the conflict between
municipal zoning ordinances that regulate billboards and the first
amendment right to free speech, using Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego 3 as the leading example ofjudicial response to the issues
encompassed by the conflict.
Metromedia is important oecause it was the first occasion that
the Supreme Court squarely addressed the constitutionality of bill
board regulation by local governments. In the past, the Court has
summarily upheld4 billboard prohibitions against first amendment
challenges. More recently, however, as exemplified by Metromedia,
the Court has held that summarily dismissed cases do not have the
same degree of authority as do decisions given plenary considera
tion. s The Court's decision in Metromedia, therefore, did not rest
upon past holdings, but rather upon an independent examination of
the facts presented. 6
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
442 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK].
3. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
4. Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440
U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978).
5. 453 U.S. at 498.
6. Id
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In Metromedia, the Supreme Court considered the validity of
the billboard ordinance of the city of San Diego. 7 The Court consid
ered separately the effect of the ordinance on commercial and non
commercial speech and used different criteria to deal with the
validity of each restriction. s The Court held that insofar as it regu
lated commercial speech, the ordinance directly served the goals of
the state and was within constitutionallimits. 9 Despite this finding,
the entire ordinance was invalidated because it unreasonably in
fringed upon an individual's right to free speech by interfering with
the use of noncommercial billboards. \0
On the issue of noncommercial speech, the Court concluded
that San Diego's general ban on billboards carrying noncommercial
advertising was invalid under the first and fourteenth amendments ll
7. The general prohibition in San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10795 (New Series), en
acted March 14, 1972, reads as follows:
B. OFF-PREMISE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING DISPLAY SIGNS PRO
HIBITED
Only those outdoor advertising display signs, hereinafter referred to as
signs in this Division, which are either signs designating the name of the owner
or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying
such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services
rendered on the premises upon which such signs are placed shall be permitted.
The following signs shall be prohibited:
1. Any sign identifying a use, facility or service which is not located on
the premises.
2. Any sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold or manu
factured on the premises.
3. Any sign which advertises or otherwise directs attention to a product,
service or activity, event, person, institution or business which mayor may not
be identified by a brand name and which occurs or is generally conducted, sold,
manufactured, produced or offered elsewhere than on the premises where such
sign is located.
453 U.S. at 493.
8. Id. at 504-05 n.l (quoting San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10795 (New Series)
(March 14, 1972». In dealing with commercial speech and the use of billboards, the
Court applied a balancing test to determine if the ordinance was directly related to a
permissible state objective. Absent a direct relationship, the ordinance must fall. See J.
NOWAK, supra note 2, at 675-76. In dealing with noncommercial speech, a strict scrutiny
test was applied where the Court required more than a direct relationship between a
zoning measure and its objective. As freedom of speech is a fundamental right, an ordi
nance will be struck down unless the state meets the burden of showing that it has a
compelling interest in the objective in question. Id A greater degree of protection is
accorded noncommercial speech as it includes political, social and personal ideas. On
the other hand, commercial speech includes (for purposes of this discussion) "speech of
any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for business purposes.'~ Id at
767.
9. 453 U.S. at 503-12.
10. Id at 512-20.
11. Id at 521.
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because it prohibited individuals from displaying, on rented bill
board space, their own political viewpoints and social beliefs. 12 Sec
ondly, the Court determined that a prohibition of all billboard
messages could not be upheld merely because the prohibition was
rationally related to a nonspeech interest. 13 The Court reasoned in
stead that noncommercial speech is a fundamental right under the
first amendment and cannot be infringed upon unless a compelling
state interest is demonstrated. 14 In Metromedia, San Diego demon
strated no compelling interest, and consequently, the ordinance was
held invalid on its face as an unconstitutional restriction of noncom
mercial speech. 15
In considering the city's ban on commercial, off-site advertising,
the Court stated that while the first and fourteenth amendments pro
tect the communicative aspects of billboards, the government retains
the authority to care for the safety of its citizens and the beauty of its
city.16 The state's power extends to improvement of the safety and
aesthetics of its cities. These governmental goals were served di
rectly by the commercial speech restriction in the San Diego ordi
nance which did not allow for off-site commercial advertising,l7
In dealing with the distinction between off-site and on-site com
. mercial advertising, the Court gave deference to the San Diego city
council and concluded that San Diego could decide to value com
mercial speech through on-site advertising, more than commercial
speech through off-site advertising, and that the San Diego city
council had acted within the scope of its power. 18
This note will analyze the rationale used by the Court to permit
municipalities to ban certain types of commercial speech as a func
tion of the police power interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. The
issue of first amendment protections afforded noncommercial speech
will also be discussed.
12. Id. at 520.
13. See note 8 supra.
14. 453 U.S. at 520-21.
IS. Id.
16. See id. at 511-12.
17. Id.
18. Id. The ordinance reflects a decision by the city of San Diego that the right to
use on-site advertising is stronger than the city's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics.
Id. The Court, however, rejected the appellants' contention that the city could not ban
all off-site commercial advertising because a commercial enterprise has a strong interest
in identifying its place of business and in advertising the goods and services available.
Other commercial enterprises that had previously used off-site advertising could just as
easily use other advertising means such as television, radio and magazines, which would
not impair traffic safety nor contribute to the ugliness of the city.
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FACTS OF METROMEDIA

The City of San Diego, California, enacted an ordinance that
imposed prohibitions on the erection of outdoor advertising display
signs. 19 The ordinance provided two exceptions to these general
prohibitions: on-site commercial signs and signs falling within
twelve categories. 20 On-site signs are defined as those naming the
business and occupant of the premises upon which signs' are struc
tured, or those advertising goods or services rendered on the prem
ises upon which the signs are placed. 21 The ordinance, therefore,
allowed on-site commercial advertising, while it prohibited off-site
commercial advertising and all noncommercial advertising. The
stated purpose of this ordinance was to maintain the city's appear
ance and to eliminate the dangers to pedestrians and motorists
brought about by the large and distracting displays.22 Appellants,
companies engaged in the outdoor advertising business,23 brought
suit in state court to enjoin enforcement of the ban on outdoor ad
vertising displays within the city.
The trial court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional
exercise of the city's police power and that it abridged appellants'
first amendment rights. 24 The California Court of Appeals af
firmed 25 on the question of the police power and did not reach the
first amendment argument. The California Supreme Court in Me
19. The Supreme Court of California defined the term "outdoor advertising dis
play sign" as "a rigidly assembled sign, display, or device permanently affixed to the
ground or permanently attached to a building or other inherently permanent structure
cons~ituting, or used for the display of, a commercial or other advertisement to the pub
lic." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 856 n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510,
513 n.2, 610 P.2d 407, 410 n.2 (1980) (citing Revenue and Taxation Code section
18090.2), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
20. 453 U.S. at 495 n.3. The signs falling within any of the following twelve speci
fied categories were not barred by the ordinance: government signs; signs located at
public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported or stored within the city, if not used for
advertising purposes; commemorative historical plaques; religious symbols; signs within
shopping malls; "for sale" and "for lease" signs; signs on public and commercial vehicles;
signs depicting time, temperature, and news; approved temporary, off-premises, subdivi
sion directional signs; and "temporary political signs." San Diego, Cal., Ordinance
10795 (New Series) (March 14, 1972).
21. 453 U.S. at 494.
22. Id at 493.
23. Id. at 496. Each cOmpany owned anywhere from 500 to 800 outdoor advertis
ing displays within the city. These signs were located in areas zoned for commercial and
industrial purposes, most of them on property leased by the appellants for the purpose of
maintaining billboards. Space on the signs was made available to interested advertisers,
and the advertisement on each sign was usually changed every month. Id. at 496.
24. Id at 497.
25. Id
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tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,26 reversed holding that the two
purposes of the ordinance were within the city's legitimate interests
because the ordinance zoned billboards in a manner beneficial to the
public safety and welfareP The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 28 Appellants argued that the ordinance was inva
lid on its face under the first amendment. 29 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of California,30 and
held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because it
prohibited all noncommercial advertising. 31

III.

BILLBOARD REGULATION

Billboards are a unique medium of communication used to con
vey messages ranging in scope from political and social comments to
commercial advertising. While billboards serve to furnish people
with information, they can simultaneously be viewed as an obstacle
to traffic safety and to the beauty of a city.
Billboards present a unique problem because they encompass
both communicative and noncommunicative aspects. 32 The commu
nicative aspect is the message conveyed on the billboard whether it
be an advertisement, traffic regulation, or political idea. The
noncommunicative aspect encompasses the billboard structure itself.
These large, immobile structures are not afforded any first amend
ment protections. Their communicative aspect, however, is pro
tected by the first amendment. Thus, although the speech is
protected by the first amendment,33 the billboard itself, upon which
the message is conveyed, is subject to regulation by the state's police
power.

26. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510,610 P.2d 407 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490
(1981).
27. Id. at 855, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 512, 610 P.2d at 409.
28. 453 U.S. at 498.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 490. Metromedia was a plurality decision. Justice White's holding and
rationale were joined by only three other Justices. See notes 145-56 infra and accompa
nying text.
31. Id. Noncommercial speech is a fundamental right which is fully protected by
the first amendment. See J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 675.
32. 453 U.S. at 501-02.
33. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 581 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L.
TRIBE].
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of the Noncommunicafive

The exercise of a city's police power34 is constitutionaP5 when it
bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare of its citizens. 36 Legislative motives or declarations
of intent do not determine the ultimate validity of a police power
ordinance. 37 Rather, the regulation must bear a rational relation to a
permissible police power purpose while providing for an impartially
administer~d, reasonable means to accomplish its police objectives. 38
Under the police power of a state, a municipality has a legiti
mate interest in controlling the noncommunicative aspects of bill
boards. 39 Yet the individual's interest in the communicative aspects
of billboards must be protected under the first and fourteenth
amendments. 40 When restrictions on the noncommunicative aspects
infringe upon the communicative aspects, it is necessary to reconcile
the state interest in the public welfare with the individual's right to
free speech. 41 In other words, the billboard structure cannot be regu
lated at the expense of freedom of speech.

B. Regulating the Communicative Aspects
of Commercial Billboards
Commercial speech has been granted some first amendment
protection in recent years,42 although there remains a distinction be
tween speech proposing a commercial transaction and ideological
34. See notes 35-40 infra and accompanying text.
35. The Court held that in order to be unconstitutional an ordinance must be
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare." Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
395 (1926) (citations omitted).
36. Id While the concept of "general welfare" is elastic and responds to the chang
ing needs of society, a number of courts have held that the general welfare does not
include aesthetic considerations unaccompanied by other public welfare considerations.
See, e.g., City of Euclid v. Fitzhum, 48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 357 N.E.2d 402 (1976) (ordi
nance that proscribed parking or storage of trailers outside of garage held unconstitu
tional as aesthetic zoning).
37. Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Ky. 1964).
38. Id at 887.
39. See Kovac v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. See J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 676.
41. The task of reconciliation falls upon the courts. "'[AJ court may not escape the
task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public
interest allegedly served by the regulation.''' 453 U.S. at 502 (quoting Bigelow v. Vir
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975».
42. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1978); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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speech. In Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Association,43 the Supreme Court
stated: "[W]e instead have afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position
in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommer
cial expression."44
In regulating the use of billboards, the government directs its
efforts at the noncommunicative impact of the structure, and must
balance the competing interests involved. 45 Regulatory choices
aimed at harms notcaused by ideas or information are acceptable as
long as the regulations do not unnecessarily interfere with the flow of
communication. 46 A regulation, therefore, will be balanced between
the value of freedom of expression and the state's interest in
regulation.
In'Metromedia, the Supreme Court recognized that the commu
nicative aspect of commercial advertising is to be afforded a limited
measure of protection.47 In affirming that commercial speech is to be
given a lesser degree of constitutional protection than noncommer
cial speech, the Court, in effect, used a balancing approach to decide
whether the billboard ordinance of San Diego unreasonably con
flicted with commercial advertising. 48 In doing so, the Court bal
anced the state's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics against the
communicative value of banned commercial messages. 49
Local governments traditionally could not regulate private
property under the police power solely for aesthetic purposes. 50 The
Supreme Court of California in Metromedia 51 overruled the seventy
one year old California case, Varney & Green v. Williams. 52 Varney
followed the traditional approach towards aesthetics by not allowing
local municipalities to regulate private property purely for aesthetic
purposes. 53
43. 436 u.s. 447 (1978). In Ohra/ik, the Supreme Court upheld a lawyer's suspen
sion from practice for face-to-face solicitation of business and did not recognize his firsi
amendment right. Id at 467-68.
44. Id at 456.
45. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 581.
46. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
47. 453 U.S. at 505-07.
48. Id at 509-12.
49. Id at 507-08.
50. See note 36 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., Varney & Green v. Wil
liams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909).
51. 26 Cal. 3d at 860-61, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 516, 610 P.2d at 413.
52. 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909).
53. 155 Cal. at 320, 100 P. at 868. The Supreme Court of California in Mefromedia
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Throughout the twentieth century, cities have sought to avoid
characterizing restrictive billboard legislation as aesthetic regulation.
Cities instead declared billboards to be public nuisances or charac
terized ordinances regulating billboards as serving standard police
power purposes.54 Most courts sustained billboard controls by
resorting to legal fiction. Courts ruled that, while aesthetics alone
could not support a billboard ordinance, aesthetic considerations
might be a legitimate police power objective if the ordinance also
served more traditional police power objectives. 55
The Supreme Court of California in Metromedia "abandoned
the legal fiction of prior decisions"56 and held that aesthetic consid
erations alone, such as improving the appearance of an urban envi
ronment to benefit the general welfare, may justify a city's exercise
of its police power. 57 The Supreme Court of the United States and
the California lower court recognized that a municipality has an in
terest in eliminating billboards designed to be viewed from the
streets and highways if the billboards unreasonably interfere with
the aesthetics of the city.58 In addition, the Supreme Court reaf
held that the two purposes of the ordinance were within the city's legitimate interests and
that the ordinance was a "proper application of municipal authority over zoning and
land use for the purpose of promoting the public safety and welfare." 26 Cal. 3d at 858,
164 Cal. Rptr. at 514, 610 P.2d at 411. The California Supreme Court rejected the appel
lants' argument that the ordinance was facially invalid under the first amendment.
54. Such police power purposes include preserving property values, protecting
tourism, or promoting traffic safety.
55. Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amend
ment, and the Realities ofBillboard Control, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 295, 296 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Aronovsky).
56. Aronovsky, supra note 55, at 296.
57. 26 Cal. 3d at 859, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 515, 610 P.2d at 412. State courts only
recently have upheld billboard prohibitions based solely upon aesthetic considerations.
In Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263,225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), the New
York Court of Appeals upheld, on aesthetic grounds alone, a municipal ordinance ban
ning off-site billboards from a small residential community. The court stated, "realisti
cally, the primary objective of any anti-billboard ordinance is an esthetic one. . . ." Id
at 269,225 N.E.2d at 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 27. See also John Donnally & Sons v. Out
door Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975). In John Donnally & Sons,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld enactments that prohibited off
premise signs within Brookline, Massachusetts. The court held that a constitutional
amendment relating to the billboards, MASS. CONST. amend. art. 50 (1918), would justify
the prohibitions, as would the municipality'S inherent police power. The court held that
aesthetics alone would justify a total prohibition of billboards under the police power.
Id at 223-24, 339 N.E.2d at 720.
58. 453 U.S. at 510-11. Noting that "[b)illboards are intended to, and undoubtedly
do, divert a driver's attention from the roadway," 26 Cal. 3d at 859,164 Cal. Rptr. at 515,
610 P.2d at 412, the Supreme Court of California agreed with other courts that a legisla
tive judgment declaring that billboards are traffic hazards is not unreasonable. See New
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firmed its determination that aesthetic considerations, coupled with
those of traffic safety, create a legitimate reason for permitting on
site commercial billboards while banning them off-site. 59
C.

Commercial Speech and its First Amendment Protections

Courts have generally treated billboards as commercial speech
by focusing on the medium of expression rather than on the content
of the message. 60 Using these means, municipalities have tradition
ally used their zoning powers to regulate the commercial speech ele
ment of billboards. 61 Commercial speech, defined as speech of any
form that advertises a product or service for profit or for business
purposes,62 has recently been vested with more first amendment pro
tection than ever before. 63 Today, the fact that an advertiser seeks a
profit cannot justify stripping his communication of all first amend
ment protection.64
In Valentine v. Chrestensen,65 the Supreme Court concluded that
the entrepreneur in New York City, by distributing his leaflet, was
attempting to "pursue a gainful occupation in the streets. . ."66 and
his right to do so was purely a matter for "legislative judgment."67
The Court inferred that New York City's code,68 prohibiting the dis
tribution of advertising matter in the streets,69 did not have to be
justified by an overriding or compelling state interest,1o nor did it
have to be judged against any inherent right to employ advertising as
man Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978); State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52,
593 P.2d 811 (1979).
59. 453 U.S. at 510-12.
60. Aronovsky, supra note 55, at 315.
61. Id Zoning powers are derived from the police power of the states. Besides
regulation of billboards, zoning powers have been used to confront many local problems:
The prevention of hazardous conditions, Railway Express Agency v. City of New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949); the control of obscenity, Note, Colorado Municipal Government Au
thority To Regulate Obscene Materials, 51 DEN. L.J. 75 (1974); and the protection of the
aesthetic environment of the community, State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33,
429 P.2d 825 (1967).
62. J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 767.
63. See note 73 infra and accompanying text; see also Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
64. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 652.
65. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
66. Id at 54.
67. Id
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id
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a business technique. 71 The Court reasoned that if speech were
purely commercial, it would be subject to regulation to the same ex
tent and for the same reasons as other forms of commercial activ
ity.72 Commentators have argued that the Chrestensen Court did not
view commercial speech as worthy of first amendment protection. 73
The Court in Breard v. Alexandria 74 subsequently extended
Chrestensen and held that door-to-door salesmen could not claim
the protection of the first amendment. Chrestensen and Breard were
later interpreted to deny first amendment protection to all commer
cial speech. 75
Notwithstanding Chrestensen, decided in 1942, and the tradi
tional exclusion of commercial speech from first amendment protec
tions, recent Supreme Court decisions have begun to afford
commercial speech some protection under the first amendment. 76
The extension of first amendment protections to purely commercial
speech is a development in first amendment jurisprudence which be
gan in three 1970's cases.
In Bigelow v. Virginia,77 the managing editor of a weekly news
paper in Virginia accepted an advertisement from a New York or
ganization that provided abortion counseling and made referrals to
New York hospitals and clinics that performed abortions. The edi
tor subsequently was convicted of violating a Virginia statute78 mak
71. ld
72. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 769; see also Aronovsky, supra note
55, at 318-19.
73. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971). The Court in
Chrestensen never defined commercial speech. Instead Chrestensen appeared to focus on
commercial motivation as the critical factor in defining commercial speech. 316 U.S. at
55. Later cases, however, made it clear that speech otherwise protected was not to be
denied protection on the basis of the speaker's commercial motivation. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (paid political advertising); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, III (1943) (advertising the sale of literature by Jehovah's
Witnesses).
74. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
75. Redish, supra note 73, at 458. Contra, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952), where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that motion pictures are
unprotected because they are made and exhibited for profit. The Court indicated that
books, newspapers and magazines are published and sold for profit, but that fact does not
prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the first
amendment. ld at 501-02.
76. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Vir
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
77. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
78. ld
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ing it a misdemeanor to encourage or to promote abortions in print
media. 79 The Court, for the first time, expressed its dissatisfaction
with the prevalent approach of resolving a class of first amendment
claims simply categorizing the speech as commercial. 80 The Court
found that the advertisement conveyed newsworthy information to a
wide variety of readers. 81 The Supreme Court stated that the Vir
ginia court erred in assuming that advertising, as such, is not entitled
to first amendment protection. 82 The Court added that speech is not
stripped of first amendment protection merely because it appears in
the form of a paid commercial advertisement. 83 Thus, according to
Bigelow, the fact that the abortion advertisement had commercial
aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests does not ne
gate all first amendment guarantees.
One year later, in Virginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc .,84 the Court gave first amendment
protection to advertisers seeking to disseminate price information for
prescription drugs. 85 The Court acknowledged that an advertise
ment communicating prescription drug prices constitutes speech that
transmits information to consumers.86 In holding the Virginia stat
ute invalid,87 the Court said that commercial speech is not wholly
outside the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Ad
vertising is intended to increase the number of sales of a particular
item or service, but that does not mean that this form of speech loses
all its first amendment protection. 88 The Court concluded, however,
that although commercial speech merits protection, some forms of
79.
80.

Id at 813.
Id at 826.
81. Id at 822.
82. Id
83. Id at 818; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)
(stating that expression does not lose constitutional protection because it appears in the
form of a paid advertisement).
84. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
85. Id at 770. Appellees, as consumers of prescription drugs, brought suit against
the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and its individual members, challenging the valid
ity under the first amendment, of a Virginia statute declaring it unprofessional conduct
for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. Id at 748.
86. Id at 765. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (Supreme
Court acknowledged a first amendment right to receive information and ideas, and de
clared that freedom of speech necessarily protects the right to receive information).
87. 425 U.S. at 770.
88. Id. at 761; see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 580 (1973). The Court in
Bales held that a total ban on price advertising by private attorneys, as enforced by an
integrated state bar and the state's highest court, violates the first and fourteenth amend
ments. Id at 384.

696

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:685

regulation are permissible. 89 Thus Virginia Pharmacy, while recog
nizing that commercial speech is entitled to first amendment protec
tions, also recognized that such speech can be regulated in certain
situations. 9O
The third case which recognized first amendment protection for
commercial speech is Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Wil
lingboro .91 A township ordinance prohibiting the posting of real es
tate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, designed to prevent ''white flight"
from a racially integrated community, was held to violate the first
amendment. 92 The Court stated that the constitutional defect in the
Willingboro ordinance, was that it "acted to prevent its residents
from obtaining certain information."93 The Court concluded that
Willingboro's concern was not with the commercial aspect of "For
Sale" signs, but with the substance of the information communicated
to the citizens of the town. 94
The Digelow line of cases gave commercial speech first amend
ment protection when such speech furnished the populace with
truthful information. That the advertisement was intended to bring
in money for the advertiser was no longer controlling9S because com
mercial speech, in the form of advertisements, was given protection
in order to inform the public of available goods and services. 96

89. 425 u.s. at 770-72. Permissible regulations of commercial speech would in
clude a time, place and manner restriction, provided that they are justified without refer
ence to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental
interest and that in so doing, they leave open ample alternative channels for communica
tion of the information. Id. at 771; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
116 (1972); U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
90. 425 U.S. at 770.
91. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
92. Id. at 97. The Court in Linmarlc used a three part test for determining the
validity of a restriction on commercial speech: (1) the restriction on speech must not
relate to the content of the regulated expression; (2) the ordinance must serve a compel
ling state interest unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) the legislation must
leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Id. at 93-97.
93. Id. at 96. The Court reasoned "that information which pertains to sales activ
ity in Willingboro, is of vital interest to Willingboro residents, since it may bear on one of
the most important decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise their
families." Id.

94. Id.
95. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809. "[S)peech is not stripped of first amendment
protection merely because it appears in the form of a paid advertisement." Id. at 818.
96. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748; see also Linmark, 431
U.S. at 85.
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THE VALIDITY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH REGULATION

The protection afforded commercial speech continued in Central
Hudson Gas v. Public Service 97 in which a four part test was used to
measure the validity of commercial speech regulation. In Me
tromedia the Supreme Court used the Central Hudson Gas test to
determine the validity of a governmental restriction98 on commercial
speech. In Central Hudson Gas, the Supreme Court held invalid a
regulation by the New York Public Service Commission which pro
hibited a utility company from advertising to promote the use of
electricity.99 The Court reasoned that although the Constitution ac
cords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitu
tionally guaranteed expression, the first amendment protects
commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. 100
The Court then created a four part test to determine when a govern
mental restriction on commercial speech would be valid:
1). The first amendment protects commercial speech only if that
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading;
2) A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is
valid only if it seeks to implement a substantial governmental
interest;
3) The restriction must directly advance that interest; and
4) The restriction must reach no farther than necessary to ac
complish the given objective. 101

In applying this test, the Court in Metromedia concluded that
the San Diego billboard ordinance, as applied to commercial speech
was constitutiona1. 102 The Court stated that the ordinance clearly
conformed to the first, second, and fourth criteria. 103
The Court gave more setious attention to the third element of
the test which deals with whether an ordinance directly advances the
substantial governmental interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. The
Court concluded that since "billboards are intended to, and un
97. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
98. In Metromedia, the governmental restriction was the billboard ordinance. See
note 7 supra.
99. 447 U.S. at 569-71.
100. Id. at 561.
101. Id. at 563-66.
102. 453 U.S. at 512. This test applies only to commercial speech because commer
cial speech is not given all first amendment protection; therefore, commercial speech
must be balanced against other interests. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. .
103. 453 U.S. at 507.
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dou~tedly do, divert a driver's attention from the roadway," 104 other
courts are correct in agreeing with a legislative judgment that bill
boards are traffic hazards. 105 With respect to the advancement of the
aesthetic interests, the Supreme Court concluded that the large bill
boards easily can be perceived as "esthetic harms," 106 and that San
Diego could rightfully choose to minimize these structures as did
other municipalities and states. 107
Using the Central Hudson Gas test for its criteria, the Court con
cluded that insofar as it regulated commercial speech, the San Diego
ordinance complied with the four requirements of the test. IOS The
Court agreed with the Supreme Court of California that the ordi
nance could validly permit on-site commercial advertising while
prohibiting it off-site under the requirements of the Central Hudson
Gas test. 109 Thus, in concluding that the test of Central Hudson Gas
allows a ban on billboards carrying commercial speech, the Court
left open the question of whether the ordinance could have prohib
ited all commercial billboards whether on-site or off-site.
If the Court were concerned only with the aesthetics and traffic
safety in the city, it could have banned all billboards, regardless of
on-site or off-site status, while still conforming to the Central Hudson
Gas test. Instead the Court balanced the governmental regulations
against the individual's right to advertise his goods or services on his
own property.IIO

104. ld at 508.
105. /d. see, e.g., E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425

F.2d 1141, 1152 (5th Cir. 1970); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 757
(N.D. 1978).
106. 453 U.S. at 510. San Diego is one of a growing number of cities that has
enacted ordinances to minimize the number of billboards in a city.
The federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028,
23 U.S.c. § 131, requires that states eliminate billboards from areas adjacent to
certain highways constructed with federal funds. The Federal Government,
also prohibits billboards on federal lands. 43 C.F.R. 292\.0-6(a). Three states
have enacted state-wide bans on billboards. Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit.
23, § 190I el seq. (1980); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 264-71 el seq. ; § 445-111 el
seq. (1976); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10, § 488 et seq. (1973).
ld at 510 n.16.
107. ld at 510.
108. ld at 503-12.
109. ld at 512.
110. ld The appellants, billboard advertisers, questioned whether the distinction
between on-site and off-site advertising is justified in terms of aesthetics or traffic safety.
ld at 511. The Court answered that the ordinance permits the occupant of the property
to use billboards located on that property to advertise goods and services offered at that
location while prohibiting all other advertisers from using those same billboards to pro
mote their goods and services. ld at 512.
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The Metromedia Court, while invalidating the entire ordinance
on other grounds, III concluded that the San Diego ordinance, inso
far as it regulated commercial speech, would have been valid within
the state's police power because it related directly to the stated objec
tives of traffic safety and aesthetics. 112 The Court also stated that
San Diego might legitimately believe that off-site advertising
"presents a more acute problem than does on-site advertising."113
Through the enactment of such an ordinance, the city demonstrated
its belief that the first amendment right to use on-site advertising is
stronger than the city's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. The
Supreme Court's decision did not reject the city's judgment. Instead,
the Court concluded that the owner of a business has a stronger in
terest in identifying his place of business on those premises than he
does in leasing its available space to another person who wants to
advertise a business enterprise located elsewhere. I 14
V.

NONCOMMERCIAL BILLBOARD SPEECH AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Although aesthetics and the preservation of property value may
be deemed legitimate state interests properly furthered through po
lice power regulation,115 no municipal ordinance can oppressively
infringe on fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. I 16 Le
gitimate state interests must be weighed against fundamental indi
vidual interests. 117 Noncommercial speech is one of the fundamental
rights expressly stated in the Constitution. 118
The standard of review used by the Supreme Court for noncomIll. The ordinance was invalidated because the Court believed that it unreasona
bly infringed on an individual's right to free speech by interfering with the use of non
commercial billboards. Id at 513.
112. Id at 512. The Supreme Court stated that this is not altered by the fact that
the ordinance is underinciusive because it permits on-site advertising. Id at 511.
113. Id at 511.
114. Id at 511-12.
liS. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
116. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (invalidating a
city ordinance restricting extended families from living in the same home); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 7 (1974) (ordinance restricting occupation of dwelling
violated no fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (judicial deference to zoning legislation will end if the legislation in
fringes on constitutionally protected rights).
117. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (first amendment interests
must be weighed against the importance of countervailing state interests).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free
dom of speech. . . ." Id
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mercial speech cases is strict scrutiny. This standard requires that a
state interest be sufficiently compelling,119 furthered by the least in
trusive means possible,120 with the means bearing a substantial rela
tion to the compelling governmental interest. 121 Governmental
restriction of noncommercial speech must be nondiscriminatory and
justified by a state interest which is unrelated to the suppression of
expression. 122 In commercial speech cases the Supreme Court ap
plies a balancing test. 123 In noncommercial speech issues the Court
places a heavy burden on the state to justify the infringement, and
requires a sufficiently compelling state interest. The Court, under
these standards of review, believed that because the San Diego ordi
nance prohibited noncommercial billboard advertising, the ordi
nance had to fall. The ordinance failed because it reached too far
into the area of protected speech. 124
In early cases, the Court sustained regulation of billboards, and
claimed that regulation did not violate first amendment require
ments.125 The Court rejected these constitutional challenges, 126
holding that the regulation of billboards fell within the legitimate
police power of local governments. 127
Since those decisions, the Court has not given plenary consider
ation to cases involving first amendment challenges to statutes or or
dinances limiting the use of billboards, preferring on several
occasions to summarily affirm decisions sustaining state or local leg
islation directed at billboards. 128
In Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 129 the Supreme
Court summarily affirmed a judgment sustaining an ordinance
which distinguished between off-site and on-site billboard advertis
ing, prohibiting the former l3o and permitting the latter. l3l The
Court rejected the claim that the ban on off-site billboard advertising
violated the first amendment. For purposes of first amendment anal
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 581.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 64 (1976).
453 U.S. at 514-15.
Id at 520-21.
Id at 521.
453 U.S. at 498.
Id at 498 n.7.
Id
Id See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
439 U.S. 808 (1978).
Id
Id
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ysis in Sujfolk, a billboard subject to the limiting ordinance was de
fined as one involving purely commercial messages. 132 The Sujfolk
definition of billboard, however, differed greatly from that in Me
tromedia,133 because the ordinance in Sujfolk did not include the
broad range of noncommercial speech prohibited by the San Diego
ordinance. 134 Thus, because the San Diego ordinance was chal
lenged on the ground that it prohibited noncommercial speech, Suf
folk was not controlling. 13S
In Lotze v. Washington, 136 on the other hand, the appellants er
ected, on their property, a billboard expressing their own political
and ideological views. 13 ? The ordinance allowed on-site commercial
advertising but banned all other speech and as such, the state or
dered the appellants to remove their billboards. 138 The Supreme
Court summarily affirmed the judgment and rejected the first
amendment challenge to the ordinance. 139
In Metromedia, the Supreme Court took a different stand on
noncommercial speech and billboards. The Court recognized that a
first amendment challenge to the ordinance created a legitimate is
sue. l40 Noncommercial speech did not lose its first amendment pro
tection merely because of the means used to communicate the
speech. 141 The fact that speech was communicated through bill
boards, instead of through television, radio, or magazines, did not
make it any less worthy of protection under the first amendment. 142
VI.

IMPLICATION OF METROMEDIA

The Supreme Court has defined the limits of billboard regula
tion by local governments through its decision in Metromedia. Local
governments may regulate commercial billboards located on private
property in the name of traffic safety and aesthetics, although defini
132. Id
133. 453 u.s. at 499.
134. Id
135. Id
136. 444 U.S. 921 (1979).
137. Id at 923.
138. Id
139. Id at 921.
140. 453 U.S. at 513.
141. Id
142. Id at 513-14. "Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose
to limit their content to commercial messages; the city may not conclude that the commu
nication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected with a par
ticular site is of greater value than the communication of noncommercial messages." Id
at 513.
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tion of the relationship between the competing interests can be diffi
cult. The state has interests which extend to promoting municipal
beautification while there simultaneously exists the danger of gov
ernmental intrusion upon individual property rights. The Court in
Metromedia held that on-site commercial advertising should not be
banned because the owner of property has an interest in advertising
his products and services. This same interest, however, does not ex
tend to those who want to advertise their goods and services on prop
erty which does not belong to them. Aesthetics and traffic safety
outweigh the interests of off-site advertisers.
Metromedia is consistent with other decisions upholding bill
board ordinances banning off-site commercial advertising. Me
tromedia, however, differs from other billboard cases because it does
not limit its analysis to commercial speech. Instead, the Court recog
nized that noncommercial speech must be protected by the first
amendment regardless of the medium of communication.
The Court held that noncommercial messages conveyed on bill
boards are to be afforded full first amendment protection. Police
power objectives of aesthetics and traffic safety are not compelling
state interests and, therefore, do not outweigh an individual's right to
free speech even if the speech is communicated through rented bill
board space.
Metromedia divided the Court.143 The plurality opinion, writ
ten by Justice White, was joined only by Justice Marshall, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Powell. The other Justices filed separate opin
ions, either concurring in part or dissenting. 144 The controversy sur
rounding M etromedia indicated that it is not the last word on the
issue of the regulation of billboards. One question yet to be an
swered is whether a city can totally ban commercial billboards as
well as noncommercial billboards if the city can show that a substan
tial governmental interest is directly furthered by such a ban. An
other unresolved issue is whether city officials have the discretion to
determine whether a proposed message is commercial or noncom
mercial. Finally, if aesthetics are a substantial reason for banning
off-site commercial billboards, it is unresolved whether aesthetics
143. The decision had five separate opinions, with the holding commanding a plu
rality of the Court. Justice Rehnquist described the Court's decision as a "virtual Tower
of Babel." Id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. Justice Brennan filed an opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined, concur
ring in the judgment. Id. at 521. Justice Stevens dissented in part and filed an opinion.
Id. at 540. Chief Justice Burger dissented and filed an opinion. Justice Rehnquist dis
sented and filed an opinion. Id. at 555.

1982)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

703

alone could be sufficiently substantial to ban on-site commercial
billboards.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan and Blackmun
viewed the San Diego ordinance as a total ban on the use of bill
boards to communicate commercial or noncommercial messages and
reasoned that the city did not show that substantial governmental
interests would be served by its ban on an entire medium of commu
nication. 14s The Justices found the ordinance to be invalid because
there existed no evidence that the ban would improve traffic safety,
the ordinance was not drafted narrowly enough to accomplish the
traffic safety goal, nor was the ban a serious effort to make beautiful
the commercial and industrial area of San Diego. l46
Justice Stevens concurred in the plurality's statement that com
mercial billboards could be banned, but he dissented from its hold
ing that noncommercial messages could not be prohibited. 147 He
stated that the plurality addressed the issue of a property owner's
right to exhibit noncommercial messages although the appellants
. had not raised the issue. 148 He stated, therefore, that this premise
which led to the plurality's holding was merely a hypothetical issue,
and not one asserted by the parties.
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, reasoned that although the first
amendment protects an individual's right to free speech, it does not
mandate a similar right for an individual to communicate by the me
dium of his choice. 149 He further argued that as long as the city does
not prevent the discussion of ideas, ISO or permit authorities to favor
some speakers and not others,lsl the city may require speakers to use
other, less intrusive mediums of communication.
The Chief Justice also differed with the plurality's holding that
the San Diego ordinance was invalid because it showed a higher re
gard for commercial speech than for noncommercial speech. 152 He
argued that the plurality denied "to every community the important
145. Id at 527-28.
146. Id at 528-34. The aesthetics argument is weak because in San Diego, bill

boards were only allowed in areas already zoned for industrial and commercial develop
ment. Id at 531-32. The aesthetics argument perhaps would have been more effective if
the city was trying to preserve areas that were pleasant to look at, as opposed to areas
where little, except commercial and industrial buildings, existed.
147. Id at 540-42 (Stevens, ]., dissenting).
148. Id at 544-45.
149. Id at 557-58 (Burger, C.]., dissenting).
150. Id at 561-62.
151. Id
152. Id at 557-58.
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powers reserved to the people and the States by the Constitution,"
and that each locality must be allowed to decide for itself the proper
limits to be placed upon speech. 153
The plurality of the Court invalidated the San Diego ordinance
and stated that the city impermissibly preferred commercial speech
over noncommercial speech. 154 The categories of commercial and
noncommercial speech, however, cannot always be separated clearly
and distinguished, especially in the instance where commercial ad
vertisers phrase their messages in ideological terms so as to obscure
the dividing line. Advertisers of any service or product may com
pare the price, efficiency, safety and performance of their goods to
those of competitors and call the message a consumer service. It is
thus often difficult to separate the two classes of speech when the
message being conveyed has characteristics of both. Local authori
ties may not want the burden of determining which messages are
commercial and which are noncommercial because such efforts
could be held to constitute a form of censorship. 155 The plurality of
Justices held the San Diego ordinance unconstitutional because it
prohibited individuals from displaying noncommercial ideas and
viewpoints on billboards which were rented to convey the
messages. 156
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Melromedia attempted to resolve the
conflict between the San Diego municipal billboard ordinance and
the first amendment right to free speech. Managing only a plurality
decision, the Court concluded that a municipality can permit bill
boards with commercial messages to be displayed on-site while
prohibiting them off-site. The Court also concluded that billboards
carrying noncommercial speech could not be banned on-site or off
site because a total ban violated the first amendment. Melromedia
reaffirmed that commercial speech is accorded some first amendment
protection, but it can be regulated under the state's police power for
the good of traffic safety and aesthetics.
The Court declared the San Diego ordinance invalid not be
cause of its ban on off-site commercial speech, but because it imper
153. ld at 567-69. "The fatal flaw in the plurality's logic comes when they con
clude that San Diego by exempting on-site commercial signs, thereby has 'afford[ed] a
greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech.''' ld at 567.
154. ld at 513-14.
155. ld at 537-40 (Brennan, J., concurring).
156. ld at 521.
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missibly restricted noncommercial speech. The Court mandated
specifically that noncommercial speech on billboards is to be ac
corded full first amendment protection unless a compelling state in
terest in their prohibition is demonstrated. The city of San Diego
failed to establish a compelling interest, therefore, the ordinance was
held to be invalid on its face. The holding, however, was supported
by only a plurality of the Justices, and the dissenting views indicate
thatMetromedia is not the Court's final pronouncement on the ques
tion of billboard regulation.
Claire Saady

